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Abstract 
The paper deals with the main report of the Danish Welfare Commission and the one-
hundred-and-nine proposals on the structure of the future Danish welfare state that the com-
mission has put forward. Following upon a brief review of the discussion on the work of the 
Danish Welfare Commission, the paper focuses on the Danish Rational Economic Agents 
Model (DREAM) that have informed the commission’s analyses and proposals and concludes 
that inspired by the general equilibrium DREAM model the Welfare Commission is mainly 
interested in how to increase the supply of labour, restrain the demand on public services, and 
install economic incentives for the behaviour of private households. The paper then digs into 
the proposals of the commission that are broadly grouped into five policy target areas con-
cerning (1) the ageing of the population, (2) the incentives for labour market participation, (3) 
competitiveness in the global economy, (4) behavioural regulation of the use of public bene-
fits and services, and (5) management within tight budgets of an increasing demand on health 
and care. Finally, the concluding section sums up the discussion and elaborates on the debate 
on the Welfare Commission’s work in terms of the use of long term prognoses and the use of 
the DREAM model. 
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Background 
The Danish Welfare Commission was initiated by the Danish government in autumn 2003 
with the purpose of analysing the future challenges of the Danish welfare system and, through 
reports, preparing the grounds for a thorough public debate. The Commission comprises nine 
independent resource people from universities, organisations and private firms supported by a 
secretariat and (independently) corresponding with the Danish government. The Commission 
released its main report on December 7, 2005 (Velfærdskommissionen, 2005d), following 
upon a series of analyses (Velfærdskommissionen, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). According to 
the Danish Welfare Commission (notably Velfærdskommissionen, 2005d), the Danish econ-
omy is facing three main challenges. First, an increasing ageing of the population combined 
with a decreasing workforce. Second, an increasing level of wealth that induces the house-
holds to choose leisure instead of work and that creates an excessive demand for public ser-
vice. Third, a process of globalisation that necessitates investments in human resources, edu-
cation, knowledge, industrial development and infrastructure. While the observation on the 
challenge posed by globalisation is in accordance with what is generally discussed in the Dan-
ish public debate and has been widely accepted, the challenges posed by the ageing of the 
population and the choice of households vis-á-vis increasing wealth have been heavily dis-
puted. Furthermore, while the Welfare Commission argues that the analyses prepared by the 
Commission may well underestimate the challenges, the critics of the Commission argue that 
the challenges are by far exaggerated. 
 The debate on the Welfare Commission has become intense during the last couple of 
months as the date for the main report came closer. One line of criticism argues that the Wel-
fare Commission is targeting a major change of the Danish welfare state that is not necessary, 
essentially political in nature and could be met by egalitarian political schemes (Greve, 2005; 
Helbak, 2005; Kolstrup, 2005; Puggaard & Abrahamson, 2005). Another line of criticism 
challenges the Welfare Commission’s argument that the average number of working hours is 
decreasing and will continue to do so, partly because of early retirement. Instead it has been 
argued that middle aged Danish men enjoy more working hours than their counterparts in 
Europe in general (Andersen, 2005b) and that even though a political scheme for postponing 
retirement may increase the supply of labour it will not increase the amount of employment 
due to a negative relationship between age and employability (Lund, 2005a). Furthermore, 
even the perception of a decreasing number of working hours has been challenged with the 
argument that it is, primarily, caused by an increasing rate of female participation (Andersen 
& Borchorst, 2005; Borchorst, 2005). A third line of criticism reflects on the current state of 
the Danish economy, arguing that the economic conditions are more healthy than perceived 
by the Welfare Commission (Andersen, 2005a) and thus disagreeing with the commission’s 
urge to part with the current emphasis of government policy on consolidating the public fi-
nances in order to equalise long term inter-generational benefits of public spending by ways 
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of accumulating public savings (Andersen, 2005c; Vastrup, 2005). Finally, a fourth line of 
criticism aims at the macroeconomic theoretical reasoning, criticising the specific assump-
tions, the perception of fiscal sustainability, and the specific modelling employed by the 
commission (Andersen, 2005d ; Jespersen, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d; Sørensen, 2005a, 
2005b, 2005c). 
 The formation of the Welfare Commission gave rise to the formation of an Alternative 
Welfare Commission formed by the Danish social policy association (Socialpolitisk Forening) 
as a protest against the Danish government and as part of a movement on “Mobilising in fa-
vour of a Denmark to be proud of” (“Mobilisering for et Danmark vi kan være bekendt”). The 
Alternative Welfare Commission comprises 25 resource people well-known as researchers 
and participants in the public debate who aim to produce two reports, of which the first (Jen-
sen et al., 2005) dealing with how to finance the Danish welfare state has been issued while 
the second is still to come. The lines of criticism described above also penetrate the first re-
port of the Alternative Welfare Commission, although the Alternative Welfare Commission 
from a social policy perspective point of view adds a number of critical points regarding par-
ticipation at the Danish labour market, educational issues, integration of immigrants, and 
various social issues. 
 The present paper devotes its attention to how the Danish Welfare Commission analyses 
the challenges of the ageing of the population and the dilemmas of welfare, especially as de-
scribed by Velfærdskommissionen (2005d) and Andersen & Pedersen (2005a, 2005b). It fo-
cuses on the main assumptions employed by the Welfare Commission in order to analyse the 
ageing of the population and the dilemmas of welfare by means of the general equilibrium 
model DREAM and how these assumptions have been challenged by researchers disagreeing 
with the basic modelling assumptions. Furthermore, the paper describes the array of welfare 
reforms suggested by the Welfare Commission – actually, the array which is in accordance 
with the DREAM model assumptions is so wide that it has surprised the public and the gov-
ernment. Finally, the paper summarises the discussions. 
 
The main assumptions of the Welfare Commission 
Traditionally, economic policy in Denmark has been informed by economic analysis based on 
econometric models, e.g. the SMEC model employed by the politically independent Eco-
nomic Council (Det Økonomiske Råd) and the ADAM model employed by the Ministry of 
Finance. These models deal mainly with the short and medium term based on statistical esti-
mation of basic economic relationships within an open Keynesian economy. Contrarily, the 
Welfare Commission has made use of a general equilibrium model, the so called DREAM 
model that has been developed since 1997 at Danish Statistics. The DREAM model – Danish 
Rational Economic Agents Model – focuses on how economic changes and policy affects the 
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incentives of economic agents, and assumes that the agents act according to rational expecta-
tions, i.e. as if they, on average, behave economically rational. While the traditional Danish 
econometric models are based on a relatively narrow set of data, the DREAM model is based 
on a comprehensive set of data covering demographic prognoses, the huge amount of Danish 
register based labour market statistics, a specific model dealing with the effects of legislative 
changes, the Danish national account, and extensive data on income, pensions, and capital, all 
available at Danish Statistics. Based on these data, the DREAM model specifically deals with 
long term prognoses of the Danish economy, economic effects of demographic changes, and 
sustainability and efficiency of fiscal policy and how changes in fiscal policy affects income 
and welfare distribution across generations, cf. Knudsen et al. (1998), Pedersen & Trier 
(2000) and Jensen, Nødgaard & Pedersen (2004) on which the following description is based. 
 The DREAM model comprises three main sectors, i.e. the households, the firms, and the 
public sector. 
The household sector consists of representative families with children where the children 
are distributed across families according to the age of the mother in the family, based on a 
demographic prognosis of age-dependent fertility. The size of the representative family 
changes during time according to probabilities of child birth and death, and according to pat-
terns for children growing up and moving out. Thus, overlapping generations exist within the 
household sector. At any time during their life span, the families choose a bundle of goods 
composed by housing, non-investment goods produced domestically or abroad, and public 
services. The budget of the family depends on its association with the labour market where 
eight categories are applied, i.e. part of the work force, studying, temporarily outside the work 
force, at leave, and four different groups of retirement arrangements. Being part of the work 
force means getting wages or unemployment benefits where the risk of being unemployed is 
determined endogenously. Retirement benefits as part of insurance schemes are fully financed 
by pension funds, and private endowments are treated according to the existing tax rules. Pri-
vate possessions of bonds and shares, transfers from abroad, and inheritance left by parent 
households enters the income as well. Finally, the model includes a lump-sum transfer in or-
der to make the budget balance at the end of each period. 
The firms are firms with limited liability, profit-maximising in order to maximise the value 
of shares. Furthermore, as pension funds are treated as marginal investors it is assumed that 
the value of share is mostly influenced by the level of profits demanded by pension funds in-
vestors. In consequence, taxation rules at the pension fund market influences the cost structure 
of firms (while taxation of private capital income does not). Investments are financed by loan 
and retained earnings while re-investments are financed by retained earnings only. The cost of 
installation of new capital and deployment of existing capital is convex, thus leading to the 
occurrence of pure profits. The convex cost curve implies that capital is adjusted only gradu-
ally. Demand for labour and materials depend on current prices as there is no time-lag in the 
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adjustment of labour and materials. As competition is imperfect, the firms face a downward 
sloping demand curve and choose production factor combinations and set output prices ac-
cordingly. 
The public sector produces non-market goods and services that are, primarily, distributed 
across the household sector according to age and gender, while other types of public activities 
such as military spending, policing etcetera are determined as a fixed proportion of gross na-
tional income. In general, the activities of the public sector are modelled according to existing 
rules, with only some minor exceptions for calibrating purposes. 
International relations appear as perfect international capital transfers, a fixed currency, 
and high elasticities of foreign trade. The combination of perfect international capital transfers 
and a fixed currency implies that the domestic interest rate is determined by the foreign inter-
est rate, thus being determined exogenously. Domestic goods are treated as imperfect substi-
tutes for foreign goods, implying that the trade balance depends on the level of domestic eco-
nomic activity. 
The factors most influential in determining total demand are employment and income, in-
cluding accumulated savings during the lifespan of households. The model assumes rational 
expectations in a setting where the rent of household savings is larger than the rate of time 
preference of household consumption. Consequently, savings are accumulated due to a long 
term plan of increasing consumption per individual as time goes by, i.e. the level of consump-
tion is positively correlated with age. 
The labour market is a competitive arena where a homogenous work force supplies labour 
and voluntarily chooses to be underemployed if the equilibrium of the model implies a level 
of unemployment. The voluntary choice of underemployment applies only to those who are 
part of the work force. The wages are determined at the demand side by the firms alongside 
their determination of the composition of labour, capital and materials in production. In the 
short and medium term, a higher supply of labour results in lower wages, more people being 
employed, but also a higher rate of unemployment as capital is adjusted only gradually. In the 
long term, capital will be fully adjusted and thus the increased supply of labour will lead to 
increased wages and lower the rate of unemployment until the wages meet the initial level. In 
consequence, because the model settles down at a stationary state the level of production de-
pends on the level of labour supply. Similarly, the public income derived by taxation depends 
in the long run on labour supply. 
 Summing up, and considering the type of proposals put forward by the Welfare Commis-
sion which are described in the next section, three important aspects of the DREAM model 
seem to have been especially important to how the commission understands the Danish econ-
omy. First, the supply of labour is crucial to the long term development of income, savings 
and taxation. Consequently, it has been important for the Welfare Commission to focus on 
how the future level of labour supply can be increased. Second, consumption is positively cor-
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related with age and thus the commission has found it necessary to focus on how the con-
sumption of public goods can be restrained and become more effective as the population 
grows older. Third, as the Welfare Commission shares the idea that agents are economically 
rational it has focused on economic incentives for behavioural regulation. 
 
The essential Welfare Commission proposals 
Five areas where political action is necessary are identified by the Welfare Commission that 
subsequently presents one-hundred-and-nine specific proposals in the main report (Velfærds-
kommissionen, 2005d), cf. figure 1. The five areas are 
(1) the ageing of the population, 
(2) incentives for labour market participation, 
(3) targeting competitiveness in the global economy, 
(4) behavioural regulation of the use of public benefits and services, and 
(5) management within tight budgets of an increasing demand on health and care. 
 
The ageing of the population 
The Welfare Commission estimates that the work force will decrease from approximately 2.8 
million at present to some 2.45 million in 2045, i.e. an absolute decrease of some 350,000 
during the next forty years. This will happen during a period of time where the demand on 
human resources will increase, partly because globalisation makes it more important to com-
pete on knowledge, and partly because the demand on public services will increase as a result 
of increasing wealth. In order to meet these different requirements the Welfare Commission 
focuses on incentives for entry and exit at the labour market. 
 Regarding entry at the labour market, the Welfare Commission notices that within tertiary 
education Danish graduates are, on average, five years older than they would have been if 
they had started secondary education right after the 9th grade of primary school and kept 
studying until tertiary graduation. Actually, primary school in Denmark comprises 10 grades, 
but the 10th grade is not mandatory and the 9th grade gives access to further education. How-
ever, about half of the Danish pupils complete the 10th grade. In order to speed up the time 
spend at education, the Welfare Commission suggests that the 10th grade is devoted only to 
pupils with learning difficulties (and hoping to decrease the number of Danish pupils that 
never get an education above primary school, which is approximately 20 % of a year). This 
suggestion which has been widely disputed in the Danish public debate is one out of ten pro-
posals on primary schooling, the other proposals aiming at improving teaching, specialising 
the education of teachers, and enforcing different types of national tests. Considering further 
education, the Welfare Commission focuses primarily on educations leading to bachelor and 
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Figure 1. Number of Welfare Commission proposals within the targeted areas (109 in total) 
Target area proposals No. 
(1) Ageing of the population 
- entry: Getting faster to the labour market 
• Primary school 
• Secondary vocational education 
• Tertiary education 
- exit: Leaving the labour market at a later point of life 
• Postponing retirement 
 
 
10 
1 
5 
 
5 
(2) Incentives for labour market participation 
Assisting young people out of work and education (>30 years old) 
Changes in the rules for unemployment benefits 
Increased demand on labour market availability for unemployed 
Increased effort for upgrading the skills of unemployment 
Increased effort for upgrading the skills of immigrants 
Economic benefits for getting a job rather than staying on social benefits 
Economic benefits of employers for employing immigrants (integration) 
Responsibility of employers for financing lay-offs 
Increased opportunities for using flexible jobs for people with low employability 
 
4 
7 
6 
6 
7 
3 
2 
3 
6 
(3) Targeting competitiveness in the global economy 
Increased financing of long-term education and R&D 
Decreased taxation of income and capital 
 
5 
4 
(4) Behavioural regulation of the use of public benefits and services 
Creating a real estate market with less public subsidies 
Focusing social benefits for housing and children for the lowest incomes 
Mandatory private saving for pensions and removal of various retirement benefits 
 
12 
2 
4 
(5) Management within tight budgets of an increasing demand on health and care 
Health taxes are determined by the regions instead of the state 
Increased individual private payment for public health and care services than today 
Increased individual responsibility for insurance against lost employability 
Increased efficiency, quality and productivity in public services 
 
1 
2 
3 
11 
 
Source: Derived from Velfærdskommissionen (2005d) 
 
master degrees. The only proposal on vocational training is about how to secure on-the-job 
training for pupils that become skilled workers, a problem that has been widely discussed in 
Denmark during the last couple of decades. In terms of educations leading to bachelor and 
master degrees, the Welfare Commission focuses primarily on economic incentives for stu-
dents to begin studying at an earlier age and to complete their studies at a faster rate. Today, 
Danish students get a monthly allowance while studying which is fixed at the number of years 
for normal completion of the education in question including an extra year, and with an option 
for getting low-rent state loans while studying. In general, the Welfare Commission suggests 
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that fast completion of studies leads to economic bonuses in terms of a decor on repayment of 
state loans, money, or tax deduction for a period of time after study has been completed. 
 Regarding labour market exit, the Welfare Commission focuses on retirement. Today, old 
age pension takes effect at the age of 65, and furthermore Danes are allowed to retire at any 
time at the age of 60-65 provided they have been member of a state approved unemployment 
insurance arrangement for at least twenty-five years within their last thirty years at the labour 
market, i.e. the so-called post-wage retirement (“efterlønsordning”) where the benefit equals 
the unemployment benefit, however at a decreasing annual rate during the period of age 60-
65. Today, four out of ten Danes aged 60-64 uses the benefits of post-wage retirement. In 
general, the Welfare Commission proposes to postpone old age retirement and to remove the 
post-wage retirement at a successive rate. Due to the prospect of enjoying a longer time span 
in Denmark, the main proposal put forward is to increase the requirement of old age retire-
ment with one month per year beginning in 2013, the main argument being that while there 
are 4 people at the labour market per Dane aged 65+ today, the number will only be 2.5 in 
2040 according to Welfare Commission prognoses. Similarly, it is suggested to increase the 
requirement for post-wage retirement with four months per year beginning in 2009 leading to 
a complete removal of the arrangement in 2028. Finally, other types of retirement are sup-
posed to be removed according to similar arrangements. The effects of the proposals on old 
age retirement and post-wage retirement are summarised in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The effects on old-age retirement and post-wage retirement, examples 
People born….. can use post-wage 
retirement at the age 
of 
months of post-wage 
retirement 
old age retirement at 
the age of 
Before 01.09.48 60 60 65 
01.07.50-31.05.51 61 51 65 and 3 months 
01.04.53-28.02.54 62 42 65 and 6 months 
01.01.56-30.11.56 63 and 4 months 30 65 and 9 months 
01.10.58-31.08.59 64 24 66 
01.06.62-30.04.63 65 and 4 months 12 66 and 4 months 
After 30.04.63 +1 month per year 
01.10.69-31.08.70 67 
01.10.80-31.08.81 
The post-wage retirement 
no longer an option 
68 
 
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d) 
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Incentives for labour market participation 
Since the prime concern of the Welfare Commission is the future size of the workforce, the 
commission devotes its main attention to incentives for labour market participation. Actually, 
the target area for incentives for labour market participation is the target area most heavily 
analysed in Velfærdskommissionen (2005d), and consequently no less than forty-four out of 
the commission’s one-hundred-and-nine proposals regards the target area in question. The 
reason is quite simple, according to the logic of the Welfare Commission. Today, some 0.9 
million adult Danes are on social benefits, of which 0.2 million are engaged in education and 
0.2 million enjoy early retirement for physical and psychological reasons. This leaves half a 
million adult Danes that enjoy different types of social benefits, primarily benefits for unem-
ployment, social welfare (for those who are not participating in unemployment insurance sys-
tems) and sick leave. Ideally, these types of benefits are applied to situations where absence 
from the labour market is temporary; however four out of ten have had little or no connection 
to the labour market during the recent three years. In most cases, these four out of ten are low-
skilled, mostly with primary school as the main educational background. Especially among 
immigrants, the problem is severe, as the rate of labour market participation is about only 50 
% as compared to 77 % of non-immigrants. The low rate of labour market participation 
among immigrants has actually been declining during the last twenty years, from some 70 % 
to the current 50 % (Velfærdskommissionen, 2005a). In essence, by creating schemes for in-
centives for labour market participation, including labour market policies for integration of 
immigrants, it may be possible to counter-act a substantial part of the decrease of the future 
work force, according to the Welfare Commission. 
 The proposals put forward by the Welfare Commission may be categorised into three 
groups: Schemes targeted at young adults, i.e. in the age group of 18-30; schemes targeted at 
providing economic incentives for an increased labour supply; and schemes targeted for in-
creasing employability in general. 
Regarding schemes targeted at the age group of 18-30, the Welfare Commission points to 
the need for shortening the period which young adults can spend before they are included in 
public arrangements for job training and education combined with a decrease in social bene-
fits in order to induce young unemployed to engage in job seeking and education. 
Concerning economic incentives for increasing the labour supply, the Welfare Commission 
primarily suggests a shortening of the period in which unemployment benefits can be ob-
tained from the present 4 years to 2.5 years combined with higher requirements for entering 
unemployment insurance arrangements. Today, in order to enter an unemployment insurance 
arrangement you need to work only fifty-two weeks full time within a period of three years, 
and if you are about to exceed your four year period of unemployment benefit you need only 
to have worked 26 weeks full time within the last three years in order to enter a new four year 
period. Consequently, the Welfare Commission suggests that the fifty-two weeks requirement 
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complies all over. In order to make this new system work, the Welfare Commission stresses 
the importance of increasing the efficiency of the current public system for finding job and 
education opportunities for the unemployed combined with economic sanctions if the unem-
ployed fails to cooperate with the public authorities on the matter. Furthermore, the commis-
sion suggests that the difference between unemployment benefits and low-paid jobs is in-
creased, primarily by tax arrangements including a bonus for getting a job if you have been 
long term unemployed or is an immigrant. 
Finally, regarding improved employability, the Welfare Commission presents a wide array 
of proposals, aiming at schemes for upgrading of skills, more flexible arrangements for people 
that for social or physical reasons need part time or less demanding jobs, a stronger emphasis 
on securing that immigrants are employable before granting them a Danish permit for em-
ployment combined with consultancy of immigrant entrepreneurs and host arrangements for 
immigrants, and special job arrangements with public subsidies where immigrants and non-
immigrants can enter on-the-job training before getting an ordinary job. In addition, it is sug-
gested that employers contribute more to unemployment insurance arrangements. The reason 
is that hiring-and-firing policies are easy to embark on today because most of the unemploy-
ment benefits are taken care of by public and semi-public financial schemes. Although these 
arrangements have contributed to high flexibility at the Danish labour market, the commission 
is concerned with the fact that about half a million employed receives unemployment benefits 
for shorter or longer periods of time at an annual basis. 
 
Targeting competitiveness in the global economy 
The point of departure for the Welfare Commission regarding how to improve the Danish 
competitiveness in the global economy is that a small high income welfare economy needs to 
compete on knowledge intensive products and services, and to counter-act the processes by 
which labour and capital flow to economic areas for reasons of taxation. Even though the ef-
fects of globalisation has been extensively analysed by the commission (Velfærdskommis-
sionen, 2005a), the number of proposals is relatively small and focused on R&D and taxation 
issues, the exception being a proposal that universities should be economically rewarded if 
they are able to educate bachelors and masters with low unemployment risks. 
 Regarding R&D, the Welfare Commission focuses on the Barcelona declaration by which 
the EU countries have stated that public and private spending on R&D must constitute a share 
of 3 % of GDP by 2010 (public spending 1 % and private spending 2 %). The background of 
the Barcelona declaration is the concern of the EU countries that the European community 
will not be able to keep up with the spending on R&D in the most important competitor coun-
tries like USA, Japan and China. In an international context, Denmark lacked behind the 
OECD average on R&D spending as share of GDP during the 1970-1980ies, but has caught 
up during the last ten years with annual average growth rates at almost 7 % (1991-2001) as 
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compared to average annual growth rates at about 2.5 % in EU15 and 3 % in OECD (accord-
ing to the OECD MSTI database employed in Velfærdskommissionen, 2005d). However, 
even though the total share of public and private spending on R&D in GDP has grown to 2.6 
%, Denmark is still lacking considerably behind the Barcelona target of 3 % and even more so 
compared to the Nordic EU countries Finland (3.5 %) and Sweden (4.2 %). An important rea-
son, the Welfare Commission argues, is that the Danish economy is dominated by small and 
medium sized firms that for reasons of their size have less opportunity to invest in R&D. 
Thus, public spending on R&D must compensate for the lack of private spending. However, 
the share of Danish public spending on R&D has been declining for almost a decade from 
0.83 % of GDP in 1998 to 0.72 % of GDP in 2005 and is supposed to increase to only 0.73 %  
in 2006 (according to the law on the fiscal year of 2006 passed in the parliament this fall). 
Consequently, in order to meet the Barcelona target in 2010, the public spending on R&D 
must grow at a rate of 12 % annually in 2007 and onwards just to reach the 1 % of GDP target 
for public spending, and grow even faster if public spending is to compensate for lack of pri-
vate spending. 
This would imply a strategy of rapid growth against which the commission is rather scepti-
cal, for two reasons. First, in order to meet the Barcelona target it is necessary to increase re-
cruitment and training of researchers. According to the Danish Research Council (Danmarks 
Forskningsråd, 2003), about 2,700 new PhD students must be recruited in 2010 as compared 
to the about 1,500 that are by now expected in 2010 based on public expenditure planning that 
is fixed at the 2006 level. Thus, the Barcelona declaration implies that the number of PhD 
students increases by 80 % during 2007-2009. However, as it has proven difficult to recruit 
PhD students in Denmark during the last five years even at the current number, the commis-
sion finds it difficult to increase recruitment rapidly without decreasing the quality of re-
searchers. Second, the Welfare Commission warns against a general increase of public spend-
ing for fear that new investments may be allocated to research groups that do not enjoy a criti-
cal mass necessary for achieving internationally comparable performance. Consequently, the 
commission proposes a careful strategy (implying that the Barcelona target will not be met in 
2010) combined with targeting internationally promising research groups and increased fi-
nancing of non-university research and knowledge institutions. 
Regarding taxation, the Welfare Commission proposes a reform of the current state tax 
system comprising a so-called bottom tax (“bundskat”) at 5.5 % of private income, a middle 
tax (“mellemskat”) at 6 % of all private income above DKR 254,000 and a top tax (“topskat”) 
at 15 % of all income above DKR 311,500 (2005 figures). Due to increasing wealth, 40 % of 
all full time employed tax payers pay maximum tax (20 % of all tax payers) as compared to 
10 % in the beginning of the 1980ies (7 % of all tax payers). In order to decrease taxation of 
labour, the commission proposes that the middle tax is removed and that the rate of top tax is 
increased to 17 % of all private income above DKR 370,000. In effect, the marginal taxation 
of wage will decrease from 63 % to 59 % (and average taxation will fall below the current 40 
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%). In addition, the Welfare Commission proposes that the tax bonus for being employed is 
increased from 2.5 % of private income (however a maximum of DKR 7,200) to 11 % of pri-
vate income (however a maximum of DKR 15,000). Furthermore, it is suggested that taxation 
on savings is reduced (however no specific proposals are put forward). Finally, the commis-
sion proposes that company taxation is reduced from 28 % to 25 %. The combined tax reform 
is supposed to take effect successively during 2010-2015. 
 
Behavioural regulation of the use of public benefits and services 
The main point of departure of the Welfare Commission regarding behavioural regulation of 
the use of public benefits and services is that due to increasing wealth less people will be in 
need of the public welfare system. Thus, the commission makes its course for dismissing a 
number of welfare benefits, e.g. old age discounts on public transportation and real estate 
taxes irrespective of the size of private fortune. Especially, the Welfare Commission focuses 
on social benefits for housing and children, savings for pensions and retirement benefits, and 
subsidies for real estate. In terms of social benefits for housing and children, the Welfare 
Commission proposes, in general, that the benefits are reduced. Concerning savings for pen-
sions and retirement benefits, it is suggested that private savings for pensions become manda-
tory and that various discounts for old age pensioners are dismissed. Regarding public subsi-
dies for real estate, a wide array of tax arrangements means that all sorts of real estate get tax 
reductions or public subsidies irrespective of increases in real estate values. For private real 
estate, the commission proposes various schemes for increasing taxation in order to keep up 
with the increase of real estate values. For private real estate used for rental business, the dis-
missal of various tax arrangements is suggested in order to let taxation reflect the real capital 
income on rental business. For real estate with shared ownership (“andelsboliger”, a common 
phenomenon in Denmark) where real estate value taxes are not in existence today, a real es-
tate value tax like the one for private real estate is suggested. Finally, it is proposed that vari-
ous subsidies and tax freedom for social housing are dismissed, and that the ensuing revenue 
is used for schemes targeting problems of social needs and ghettoisation within the social 
housing sector. 
 
Management within tight budgets of an increasing demand on health and care 
The Welfare Commission anticipates an increasing demand on health and care, for several 
reasons. Ceteris paribus, the ageing of the population increases the demand on health and care 
services as older people demand more services than young people. Additionally, a rapid rate 
of innovation within the health sector leads to more advanced opportunities for treatment 
which, besides leading to an increasing demand, also implies higher levels of expenditure. 
The Welfare Commission expects that these inducements to demand will become stronger as 
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wealth increases due to the empirical phenomenon that demand tends to grow faster than real 
income (Wagner’s Law), and that an ensuing financial pressure will occur due to the tendency 
of productivity in services to grow slower than in the economy as a whole (Baumol’s Law), 
cf. Andersen & Pedersen (2005a, p.201). All of this implies that the historical tendency of 
health and care expenditures to grow at a faster rate than GDP will persist, or even become 
stronger, in the future. Thus, managing within tight budgets will become even more important 
in the future. 
 In 2007, when the new Danish structural reform takes effect and the regional level will 
deal mainly with the health sector (Gjerding, 2005), the current regional tax is dismissed and a 
new health tax put in its place. As for now, the health tax will be claimed by the state that 
subsequently will transfer allowances to the new regions, partly as general allowances, partly 
as discrete allowances targeting specific areas and fields of activity. However, as management 
within tight budgets becomes even more important in the future – assuming that the health tax 
will not increase – the Welfare Commission suggests that the claim of the health tax is trans-
ferred to the regional level in order to make sure that responsibility for expenditures and how 
to finance the expenditures are placed at the same level of government. Furthermore, the 
commission suggests private individual payment for a number of health and care services in 
order to finance about 10 % of the growth in expenditures within the sector and install behav-
ioural regulations for downsizing the growth of future demand. Today, private individual fi-
nancing of the sector is 18 % of total financing, mainly in terms of payment for visiting doc-
tors and dentists, buying hearing aids and glasses, and so on (Indenrigs- og Sundhedsminis-
teriet, 2005, as employed in Velfærdskommissionen, 2005d). Increasing financing by private 
individual payment will mainly contribute to public budgets since private hospitals and 
cliniques cover only 1.5 % of total health capacity in Denmark. Figure 3 compares the current 
Danish system with those of the other Nordic countries, as far as the health sector is con-
cerned. 
 
Figure 3. Extent of private individual payment in the health sector 
 Consulting 
the family 
doctor 
Consulting specialised doc-
tors and temporary treat-
ment at hospitals 
Being admitted 
to hospitals 
 
Medicine 
Denmark Free in most cases Free 
Sweden SPIP 
Norway Free 
Finland 
 
Some private individual payment 
(SPIP) SPIP 
 
Some private 
individual pay-
ment 
 
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d) 
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However, although private individual payment will contribute to financing health and care, 
the main contribution to managing within tight budgets must come from focusing on produc-
tivity and quality of services, the Welfare Commission argues. Consequently, the commission 
puts forward an array of proposals to that effect mainly based on three types of instruments: 
Benchmarking and performance contracts between authorities and hospitals, and between hos-
pitals and hospital management; combining general budgeting with an increased discrete 
budgeting in order to target specific fields of activity and gradually decrease some budgeting 
in order to force especially local authorities in the field of care to become more effective; and 
public tender aiming at decreasing the cost of producing public services while maintaining or 
perhaps increasing the level of quality. 
 
Conclusion 
Inspired by the DREAM model, the Welfare Commission has focused on the long term in 
analysing the future challenges to the Danish welfare system and stressed the importance of 
increasing the supply of labour, decrease the demand on public services and improve the fi-
nancial base of the welfare state, primarily by economic incentives. Their proposals imply the 
removal of a number of existing social benefits, based on the argument that due to increasing 
wealth fewer becomes dependent on social benefits and thus the remaining social benefits can 
be targeted as those who really need it – an argument that as a response to criticism regarding 
decreasing solidarity in the Danish welfare state has been rephrased as “true” solidarity 
(Velfærdskommissionen, 2005d) and that targeted welfare does not necessarily lead to less 
welfare (Kleven, Kreiner & Lassen, 2005). 
 The Danish government has adopted a cautious approach to the proposals of the Welfare 
Commission which have induced political commentators to frantic speculation. The specula-
tions have mainly followed two paths: On the one hand, the commission has been accused of 
adhering to a hidden governmental agenda on how to transform the current welfare state into a 
more liberal and laissez-faire society, so it may be wise for the government not to embrace the 
proposals of the commission right away. On the other hand, an important part of the political 
strategy of the government is to change the welfare state only gradually in order to make sure 
that its political base does not fail, primarily taking into consideration that the main supporter 
of the government, the right-winged Dansk Folkeparti, has adopted the classic social democ-
ratic concern for social benefits for pensions, health and care. Consequently, the wide array of 
proposals put forward by the Welfare Commission is slightly embarrassing because it in-
volves moving too fast. A third line of speculation might be that the Welfare Commission has 
criticised the Danish tax stop (Velfærdskommissionen, 2005d, ch.11), i.e. the fact that Danish 
taxes have been fixed during the present government, an initiative that carries extremely high 
political priority. On the one hand, the commission argues in favour of the tax stop, stating 
that it can be interpreted as a kind of budget rule by which the public sector is supposed to be-
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come increasingly effective as the real value of public expenditure is decreasing on an annual 
basis. On the other hand, the commission finds that the tax stop is perverting the tax structure 
For instance; the tax on real estate has been fixed at the 2001 level with the effect that the 
strong increase in Danish real estate values since 2001 has been tax free which might the 
commission interprets as a state subsidy to private real estates. At any rate, the real estate tax 
share of public revenue will fall from the current 0.7 % of GDP to 0.4 % of GDP in 2040, ac-
cording to the Welfare Commission’s prognosis. A similar reasoning goes for value added 
taxes where the current share of 4.5 % of GDP is expected to fall to 2.8 % in 2040. While this 
is exactly the kind of development desired by the current liberal government, the Welfare 
Commission argues that the tax stop contributes to make the financial pressure on the public 
finances even more severe than anticipated by the commission. 
 As mentioned initially, several lines of attack against the Welfare Commission has been 
launched. Among economists, especially the use of the DREAM model has been controver-
sial. Actually, Jespersen (2005c, p.245) has argued that the Welfare Commission interprets 
the results of the DREAM model incorrectly since within a general equilibrium model the 
public sector does not experience financial constraints. If the economy is closed, a public 
deficit is balanced by a private sector surplus. If the economy is open, as in the DREAM 
model, a public deficit is divided between the private sector and foreign markets. Thus, de-
pending on the level of private saving, a public deficit is translated into a balance-of-payment 
problem and not necessarily into a fiscal problem. However, this line of argument is mainly 
for polemic reasons. In general, two broad arguments have been put forward. 
First, it has been argued that long term prognoses are extremely uncertain and that the en-
suing results must be interpreted with the outmost care. It is almost impossible to predict what 
will happen in society, for instance if one takes into account the considerable structural 
changes of modern life during the last thirty years. Furthermore, the results depend heavily on 
the initial parameters, and it is generally argued that the Welfare Commission is too pessimis-
tic and subsequently employs wrong parameters (e.g. Andersen, 2005d; Lund, 2005b). For in-
stance, Lund (2005b) argues that the commission underestimates the increase in the level of 
skills of the work force and the increase in the level of labour market participation among 
immigrants, and that the commission makes the error of equating longer life span with an in-
crease in the demand for health services. Thus the commission underestimates the future la-
bour supply and overestimates the demand on health services. In addition, Lund (2005c) 
points to the uncertainties of demographic prognoses and goes through a number of prognoses 
prepared by Danish Statistics, the Economic Council, the Danish government, and the Wel-
fare Commission that show a considerable range both regarding the estimates of population 
and the estimates of expected life span. These points of view have also been advocated by 
Andersen (2005d) and Sørensen (2005c) in a debate where they are refuted by the Welfare 
Commission (Andersen & Pedersen, 2005b). 
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Second, the DREAM model itself has been attacked. The main criticism is that the neo-
classical foundations of the model do not reflect the intricacies of the current Danish welfare 
state. Basically, since agents behave rationally and the future can be predicted and thus taken 
into account in private economic behaviour, a public sector is not really needed, according to 
Jespersen (2005d) who furthermore argues that the DREAM model analyses the public sector 
as a private sector, however primarily financed by taxes, with no effect on total production 
and employment even in cases of increased public activities, apart from consuming almost 
fixed parts of GDP (Jespersen, 2005c). However, the interpretation of the passive role of the 
public sector has been refuted by the Welfare Commission by reference to an indirect effect, 
stating that the public sector affects total production and employment by the effect of public 
spending on the composition of total spending (Andersen & Pedersen, 2005b). Concerning the 
equilibrating mechanisms of the model, disagreements have been on how to model intergen-
erational income distribution, and whether the DREAM model assumes too fast adjustments 
to equilibrium (Vastrup, 2005; Andersen & Pedersen, 2005b). Regarding unemployment, 
DREAM fixes the basic rate of unemployment at 5 % and rates of unemployment above this 
level occur as voluntary unemployment based on a rational choice between labour and leisure. 
In the long run, the model settles down at a stationary state where the distribution between la-
bour and leisure is determined by the initial wage formation at the level of 5 % unemploy-
ment. Thus, the size of labour supply becomes essential to fiscal sustainability of the welfare 
state. Finally, as argued by Jespersen (2005d), due to Pareto optimality the model functions 
without a measure of distribution and welfare, i.e. the utility value of marginal income is as-
sumed to be same for rich and for poor, and the same in all kind of uses. Redistribution will 
diminish total welfare, and welfare is not increased if money are spend on education rather 
than charter holidays (ibid., p.72). 
Abstracting from the economic-theoretical discussions on the work of the Welfare Com-
mission and the DREAM model, one major observation comes to mind. The extensive use of 
the DREAM model by the Welfare Commission is outstanding in the sense that for the last 
four decades economic policy in Denmark has mainly been informed by Keynesian reasoning. 
The exclusiveness by which the DREAM model has informed the theoretical and practical de-
cisions of the Welfare Commission is in conflict with a long-standing policy tradition. Invok-
ing neoclassical reasoning on general equilibrium as part of a major political agenda is bound 
to cause resistance within the Danish economic community and among those who oppose the 
right-wing liberal agenda of the present government. Thus, the debate will probably become 
even more intense during the coming months as the government starts initiating proposals in-
spired by the Welfare Commission. 
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